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Abstract 
Based on a simple model of compatibility choice under differentiated Cournot duopoly 
with network externalities, we consider how the levels of a network externality and 
product substitutability affect the choice of compatibility. In particular, if the level of 
network externality is larger than that of product substitutability, there are multiple 
equilibria involving imperfect and perfect compatibility. Furthermore, we demonstrate 
the conditions for constructing such a network alliance so that firms provide perfectly 
compatible products. The network alliance is stable and socially optimal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In network industries, e.g., airlines, railways, telecommunications, application software, 
operating systems, and Internet services, we can observe not only network externalities 
but also compatibility and standardization of products and services. In particular, 
compatibility is a characteristic of products and services that interact with other 
products and services to enhance performance for users.  Thus, the problems of 
compatibility and standardization are important for firms (providers), consumers (users), 
and the policy maker. However, the choice of compatibility between products and 
services tends to be made by providers rather than by users, unless an intervention by 
the policy maker occurs. 
Since the publication of the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985), many 
researchers have examined social and private incentives to achieve product 
compatibility, which refers to the trade-off between compatibility and standardization 
(or between incompatibility and perfect compatibility) in the presence of a network 
externality.1 
We observe that there are several degrees (i.e., imperfect, partial, and perfect) of 
compatibility between products and services in network industries. For example, in 
Case 20.6 of Belleflamme and Peitz (2010), they treat Skype, which is a software 
program that allows users to make telephone calls over the Internet, as an example of a 
communication network. That is, Skype is a partially compatible product because an 
                                                 
1 See also Katz and Shapiro (1994), Matutes and Regibeau (1996), Shapiro and Varian 
(1999), Gandal (2002), Farrell and Klemperer (2007), Shy (2011), Farrell and Simcoe 
(2012). 
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off-net call (i.e., a call outside the community for a fee) has lower utility than an on-net 
call (i.e., a call within the community free of charge). Furthermore, estimating network 
effects and compatibility in the Polish mobile market, Grajek (2010) finds that there are 
strong network effects and that the estimated degree of compatibility is very low despite 
full interconnection of the mobile telephone network. 
As another example, with respect to application software markets, we consider 
word-processing software. In this case, various types of word-processing software (e.g., 
WordPerfect, Corel Write, King Writer, and JustSystems Ichitaro) may be perfectly or 
partially compatible with Microsoft Word. Furthermore, Gandal (1995) empirically 
analyzes complementary network externalities in personal computer software markets 
because users need to exchange data files between spreadsheets and database 
management systems. He describes, for example, a statistical analysis package such as 
TSP, which is fully compatible with Lotus files, but not with DBF. 
Taking the framework of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we develop a 
simple model of one-way compatibility choice under differentiated Cournot duopoly 
with network externalities. Using the model, we consider how the level of a network 
externality and product substitutability affect the compatibility choice. 
Chen and Chen (2011), whose work is closely related to ours, analyze compatibility 
choice under a horizontally differentiated duopoly with network externalities. However, 
based on their specific assumption, they consider only the case of a strategic substitute 
relationship, and they conclude that a firm’s optimal choice is an incompatible product 
in the market, whereas socially optimal compatibility involves establishing the perfectly 
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compatible standard. In such a case, a social dilemma arises.2 In the current paper, we 
relax their assumption and demonstrate that if the level of a network externality is larger 
than that of product substitutability, then there are multiple equilibria involving 
imperfect and perfect compatibility. Thus, a social dilemma need not always arise. 
Furthermore, we consider a network alliance between firms as a collusive behavior. We 
demonstrate that the stable network alliance is socially optimal where firms provide 
perfectly compatible products. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Setup 
We develop a Cournot duopoly model in a network industry, where a firm provides a 
horizontally differentiated product with a network externality. Based on the framework 
of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we assume that a linear inverse demand 
function of product i is given by: 
),( eijii SNqqAp    ,2,1, ji  ,ji                     (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size, iq  )( jq  is the output level of firm i (j), and 
 1,0  is the level of product substitutability. In other words, it represents the level of 
product differentiation, i.e., if 0  ,1  the products are more horizontally 
differentiated (homogenous). )( eiSN  is a network externality function, where 
e
iS  
represents the expected network size for product i. To simplify the analysis, we assume 
                                                 
2 See also Toshimitsu (2014). 
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that ,)( ei
e
i nSSN   where  1,0n  represents the level of a network externality. 
As mentioned above, the level of compatibility is endogenously determined by firms 
(providers). Compatibility is an important factor affecting an expected network size. 
Furthermore, we assume one-way compatibility in this model. Using Chen and Chen 
(2011), we assume the following formulation of an expected network size with 
compatibilities. 
,ejj
e
i
e
i qqS   ,2,1, ji  ,ji                             (2) 
where  1,0j  denotes the level of compatibility, which is the strategic variable of 
firm j. If 1j  ,0  then product j operates (does not operate) with product i perfectly, 
i.e., perfect compatible (incompatible) product. eiq  in equation (2) represents the own 
effect on the expected network size. ejjq  implies that the demand spillover effect on 
the expected network size of product i depends on the level of compatibility of firm j. In 
other words, firm j makes the use of its product (e.g., content or system) for the rival 
firm’s consumers (users) possible. Thus, we may appreciate that 1j  0  implies an 
Open (a Closed) strategy of firm j. 
Considering the concept of a fulfilled expectation presented by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985), we assume that consumers develop expectations for network sizes after the 
firms make their output decisions.3 This implies that the firms can commit to their 
                                                 
3 See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996). Strictly speaking, we consider 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in which consumers observe output levels (capacities) 
before making actual consumption decisions. Because consumers have to make their 
choice given the choices of all other consumers in the Nash equilibrium, each 
consumer’s beliefs about the behavior of the other consumers are confirmed. In the 
appendix, we examine the case where consumers form expectations regarding network 
size before the firms’ output decisions. 
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output level, so that consumers believe the output levels and then form expectations 
regarding the network size, i.e., ,i
e
i qq   .2,1i  Thus, equation (2) can be rewritten 
as follows: 
,jjii
e
i qqSS   ,2,1, ji  ,ji                          (3) 
where iS  is the actual network size of firm i’s product. 
Hereafter, we consider a two-stage game: in the first stage, firms choose the level of 
compatibility; in the second stage, firms determine the level of output (i.e., Cournot 
competition). We derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) by backward 
induction. Furthermore, apart from some references to firm j, we mainly consider firm i. 
Based on equations (1) and (3), we derive the following inverse demand function of 
firm i’s product4: 
,)()1( jjii qnqnAp    ,2,1, ji  .ji               (4) 
Regarding equation (4), we assume that ,1 jnn    such that the own-price 
effect exceeds the cross-price effect; i.e., .
j
i
i
i
q
p
q
p


  This condition implies that 
.1  n  Furthermore, we assume that production costs are zero, because we readily 
observe low and even negligible marginal running costs in Internet businesses. Thus, the 
profit function is .iii qp  
Hereafter, we consider a two-stage game: in the first stage, the firms choose the 
degree of product compatibility; in the second stage, the firms determine the output (i.e., 
Cournot duopolistic competition). We derive an SPNE by backward induction. 
                                                 
4 This formulation is similar to that of Crémer et al. (2000) and Ji and Daitoh (2008). 
They assume a homogenous product market. 
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Furthermore, unless we specifically refer to firm j, we address firm i. 
 
2.2 The Cournot–Nash equilibrium 
Based on equation (4), the first-order condition of profit maximization is given by: 
.0)()1(2)1( 

jjiii
i
i qnqnAqnp
q
  
Thus, we derive the following reaction function for firm i: 
,
)1(2)1(2 j
j
i qn
n
n
Aq 


 ,2,1, ji  .ji                    (5) 
Given equation (5), the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the 
levels of product substitutability and compatibility with network externalities, i.e., 
,)(0)( j
j
i n
q
q  
  ,2,1, ji  .ji   This implies that a strategic substitute 
(complement) relationship emerges if the level of product substitutability is larger 
(smaller) than that of compatibility with a network externality of the rival firm. In 
particular, although the two products are substitutable, a relationship of strategic 
complementarity is sustained under Cournot competition if the level of compatibility 
with a network externality is sufficiently large, i.e., if . jn  Hereafter, we refer to 
compatibility with a network externality, i.e., ,jn  as network compatibility. 
Taking equation (5), we derive the following Cournot–Nash equilibrium: 
 
,
)()1(2
D
nnA
q ji
   ,2,1, ji  ,ji                   (6) 
where .0))(()1(4 21
2   nnnD   
In view of equation (6), the effect of an increase in the level of compatibility of 
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firms i and j on the output of firm i are given by: 
,)(0)(
)(
ji
j
i
i nq
D
nnq  

                    (7) 
.0)1(2 

j
j
i q
D
nnq
  ,2,1, ji  .ji                       (8) 
Equation (7) shows that the effect of an increase in the level of compatibility of firm 
i depends on the levels of product substitutability and network compatibility of firm j. If 
the level of network compatibility of firm j is larger (smaller) than that of product 
substitutability, the output of firm i increases (decreases). Furthermore, equation (8) 
implies that an increase in the level of compatibility of firm j increases the output of 
firm i, because an increase in the level of compatibility of firm j enhances the network 
size of firm i and also increases consumers’ willingness to pay for product i. 
 
2.3 SPNE in the strategic compatibility choice 
The profit function of firm i is expressed as:   ,)1( 2ii qn  .2,1i  Taking 
equations (7) and (8), we obtain the following: 
  ,)(0)()()1(2 2 jji
i
i n
D
nn
qn 
 
             (9) 
.0)1()1(4 

D
nnqqn ji
j
i

                             (10) 
where  ,1,0, ji   ,2,1, ji  .ji   
From equation (9), if the level of network compatibility for the rival firm is larger 
(smaller) than that of product substitutability, then the level of compatibility increases 
(decreases) firm i’s profit by the complement (substitute) effect caused by firm j. In this 
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case, firm i chooses a perfect compatibility (incompatibility) i.e., 1i ),0(  .2,1i
However, if the level of network compatibility equals that of product substitutability, i.e., 
firm i is indifferent to choosing any level of compatibility from incompatibility to 
perfect compatibility, i.e.,  ,1,0i  .2,1i  
Because we obtain the same results with respect to firm j, we derive the SPNE in the 
noncooperative compatibility choice as follows. 
 
Proposition 1  
The following SPNE exists. 
(i) If ,n  then ,0* i  .2,1i  
(ii) If ,n  then 0* i  and ,1* i  .2,1i  
 
With respect to (i), if the level of a network externality is smaller than that of 
product substitutability, then both firms provide an incompatible product. With respect 
to (ii), if the level of a network externality is equal to or larger than that of product 
substitutability, then two equilibria exist. For this case, we should note the following. If 
,n  then there are three SPNE; ,0* i  ,* ni
   and ,1* i  .2,1i  However, at 
the equilibrium, ,*
ni
   it holds that ,,,* 




nnn lii
  for any  ,1,0i  
.2,1i  Thus, this equilibrium is unstable. Hence, both firms provide either an 
incompatible product or a perfectly compatible product. 
Furthermore, regarding the parameters, n  representing the strength of a network 
externality is a complementary effect, while   representing the level of product 
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substitutability is a substitutionary effect. In other words, the former implies the degree 
of a firm’s cooperative behavior, while the latter that of a firm’s competitive one. Thus, 
a strong network externality means that firms are likely to determine the level of 
compatibility cooperatively. 
Now, we should consider the effect of the outcomes of the SPNE in Proposition 1 on 
social welfare. Chen and Chen (2011, Proposition 5) have already demonstrated that a 
perfect compatibility is socially optimal (S), i.e., ,1Si  .2,1i  From the perspective 
of social optimality, because there are multiple equilibria in the case of a strong network 
externality, i.e., ,n  it is not necessary for both firms to choose perfect compatibility. 
Furthermore, socially optimal compatibilities do not arise in the case of a weak network 
externality. 
 
2.4 Network alliance: Socially preferable collusion 
We consider the possibility of a network alliance among firms. This implies that both 
firms cooperatively determine the level of compatibility to maximize the aggregate 
profits, i.e.,   ., 2121    That is, the FOC to maximize the aggregate profits is 
given by: 
.0)1(2)1(2 2 









ji
i
j
j
i
i
i
i
Hq
D
Annqqqqn           (11) 
where     ,0)1(2 221  jj nhhnH     ,01  ii nnh   ,2,1, ji  
.ji   Because we obtain the same results with respect to firm j, we derive the SPNE 
under cooperative (collusive) compatibility (C) as follows. 
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Proposition 2 
Cooperative (collusive) compatibility is ,1Ci  .2,1i  That is, because both firms 
provide perfectly compatible products, a social dilemma dose not arise. 
 
Equation (11) demonstrates that the firms are likely to construct a collusive network 
alliance with respect to the products (e.g., Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Ch. 8). In this case, 
we have the following question: Can the network alliance be sustainable (stable)? 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that firm i chooses incompatibility, i.e., ,0i  
when firm j chooses perfect compatibility, i.e., ,1j  under the network alliance. 
Taking equation (6), we derive the following relationship: 
        ,)(1,1)(1,01,1)(1,0 nqq iiii    .2,1i  
If the level of a network externality is smaller (larger) than that of product 
substitutability, that is, with a weak (strong) network externality, firm i has (do not 
have) an incentive to deviate from the alliance. Let us summarize the result as follows. 
 
Proposition 3  
With a strong network externality, i.e., ,n  the network alliance is sustainable and 
socially preferable. 
 
Proposition 3 implies that given a strong network externality, collusive behavior 
regarding the decision of compatibility may not be ani-competitive but can improve 
consumer surplus and thus social welfare. In other words, product standardization 
among firms raises the prices, whereas it increases consumer surplus by the 
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complementarity effect through a strong network externality. As an example, we can 
observe various alliances (linkups) of airlines, railways and telecommunications 
companies. Therefore, if our results hold, such collusive network alliances do not 
necessarily reduce consumer surplus. In other words, a network alliance can improve 
social welfare. 
 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
Intuitively, a perfectly compatible product standard is socially optimal or, at least, is 
preferable for consumers. However, competing firms in network product markets may 
choose an incompatible product (e.g., i-OS vs. Android). 
In this paper, we have considered how the presence of a network externality affects 
the one-way compatibility decision of competing firms and have demonstrated that 
there are multiple equilibria, i.e., incompatible products and perfectly compatible 
products. In particular, perfectly compatible decisions are socially preferable. However, 
it is uncertain whether the socially preferable equilibrium arises. In other words, a social 
dilemma case may arise where each firm’s profit increases but consumer surplus 
decreases. In this case, we have considered a network alliance and demonstrated the 
conditions for constructing a stable and socially preferable network alliance. 
Various limitations arise in relation to our model, as well as the specificity of the 
demand and network functions. For example, although we have considered the case of 
Cournot duopoly, we should analyze the case of Bertrand competition and extend it to 
the case of oligopoly. Furthermore, we have addressed the case of one-way and 
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horizontal product compatibility. In the future, we will extend our model to the cases of 
two-way compatibility and vertical product compatibility.  
 
 
Appendix: The case of consumers ex ante expectations 
Taking equations (1) and (2), the profit function of firm i is given by: 
  ,)( ieijii qSNqqA    ,2,1, ji  .ji                (A.1) 
The FOC of profit-maximization of firm i is:  
,0)(2 
 e
ijiii
i
i SNqqAqp
q
  ,2,1, ji  .ji      (A.2) 
At the point of a fulfilled expectation, i.e., when i
e
i qq   and ,jej qq   in view of 
equations (2) and (A.2), we obtain the following: 
,0)()2(  jji qnqnA   ,2,1, ji  ,ji               (A.3) 
Thus, we derive the following fulfilled expectation Cournot equilibrium: 
  
,
2**

 Annq ji

 ,2,1, ji  ,ji                   (A.4) 
where      .02 212   nnn  Using equation (A.2), the profit of firm i 
can be expressed as:   ,2**** ii q  .2,1i  
Given equation (A.4), the effects of an increase in the level of compatibility of the 
firms on the equilibrium output are given by: 
 
,)(0)(**
**
 


ji
j
i
i nq
nnq                   (A.5) 
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  ,02 **** 


j
j
i qnnq  ,2,1, ji  .ji                     (A.6) 
   We proceed to the game of compatibility choice. Based on equations (A.5) and (A.6), 
we derive the following: 
    ,)(0)(2 2****    jijii nq
nn
              (A.7) 
  ,022 ****** 


ji
j
i qqnn
                               (A.8) 
where  ,1,0, jj   ,2,1, ji  .ji   
Thus, as shown in the text, we derive the same result as in Proposition 1 in the text. 
Therefore, by the same procedure as in the text, we can derive the same results as in 
Propositions 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15
References 
Belleflamme, P. and Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.576. 
Chen, H-C. and Chen, C-C. (2011) Compatibility under Differentiated Duopoly with 
Network Externalities, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 11, pp. 43−55. 
Crémer, J., Rey, P. and Tirole, J.  (2000) Connectivity in the Commercial Internet, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 48, pp. 433−72. 
Economides, N. (1996) Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations to 
Enter, European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 211−33. 
Farrell, J. and Klemperer, P. (2007) Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in Armstrong, M. and Porter, R. (eds.), 
Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 1967–
2072. 
Farrell, J. and Simcoe, T. (2012) Four Paths to Compatibility, in Peitz, M. and 
Waldfogel, J. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford 
Handbooks, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 34−58. 
Gandal, N. (1995) Competing Compatibility Standards and Network Externalities in the 
PC Software Market, Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, pp. 599–608. 
Gandal, N. (2002) Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects: Some Policy 
Implication, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18, pp. 80–91. 
Grajek, M. (2010) Estimating Network Effects and Compatibility: Evidence from the 
Polish Mobile Market, Information Economics and Policy, 22, pp. 130–43. 
Ji, H.-S. and Daitoh, I. (2008) Interconnectivity Agreement between Internet Service 
Providers and the Optimal Policy Intervention: The Case of Counter-Type 
 16
Competition under Network Externalities, Japanese Economic Review, 59, pp. 
228−240. 
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
American Economic Review, 75, pp. 424–40. 
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1994) System Competition and Network Effects, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 8, pp. 93–115. 
Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P. (1996) A Selective Review of the Economics of 
Standardization: Entry Deterrence, Technological Progress, and International 
Competition, European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 183−209. 
Shapiro, C. and Varian, H. R. (1999) Information Rules, Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Shy, O. (2011) A Short Survey of Network Economics, Review of Industrial 
Organization, 38, pp. 119–49. 
Toshimitsu, T. (2014) Compatibility under Differentiated Duopoly with Network 
Externalities: A Comment, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 14, pp. 
331−35. 
